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voluntary organisations and/or youth rep-
resentatives. Honing in on the role educa-
tion plays, Cynthia Miller-Idriss, in ’Rais-
ing the Right Wing: Educators’ Struggle to 
Confront the Radical Right,’ focuses on 
Germany’s distinct history, coming to 
terms with its Nazi past, and the effect this 
has on neo-Nazi youth movements. The 
author presents individual cases of youths 
engaging with extreme-right ideologies in 
Germany before arguing that teachers are 
often unprepared to counter extremism 
among their students, nonetheless identify 
students that might be holding contentious 
ideologies. The chapter also argues that the 
younger generations are resistant to the 
national taboos against neo-Nazi ideolo-
gies that overlap with national pride. Edu-
cators have a potentially strong role in 
helping students engage in dialogue about 
national issues in a way that also serves to 
prevent the allure of extremist ideologies. 
Overall, this book presents an excel-
lent range of academic engagement with 
the subject of youth and extreme-right ide-
ologies. Sections are also introduced with a 
range of questions for the reader to ponder 
while reading, making this book a good 
addition to syllabuses for university-level 
courses touching upon this subject. One is 
perhaps surprised that far right groups are 
often not addressed directly in many chap-
ters, and instead a variety of factors are 
tracked that contribute to, or facilitate pro-
cesses of radicalisation. 
Despite efforts to clarify the relation-
ship between youth and the extreme right, 
the reader is rather left in a position to 
question the complexity and multi-varia-
ble factors that lead to extreme-right par-
ticipation. The book cautions readers from 
the start to keep an open mind about the 
heterogeneous nature of what is labelled 
’extreme right’ across Europe and the Unit-
ed States. Cas Mudde reminds us that only 
by building an understanding of the com-
plex life experiences and choices young 
people face can we better assess what 
makes them embrace extreme-right ideolo-
gies and join extreme-right groups and po-
litical movements. This understanding is 
necessary in order to effectively prevent 
and intercept radicalisation processes. 
Erin Marie Saltman
Institute for Strategic Dialogue, London
erin.saltman@gmail.com
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In philosophical discussions of distributive 
justice two issues have traditionally occu-
pied centre stage. The fi rst is the currency 
of justice: whether we should concern our-
selves with individuals’ resource holdings, 
their opportunities, or with their well-be-
ing. The second is the structure of our just 
distribution. A concern for relative equality 
between individuals motivates relative 
egalitarians; prioritarians suggest that indi-
viduals’ claims grow stronger the worse 
their absolute positions; and suffi cientari-
ans insist that there are important thresh-
olds that defi ne a stark difference in the 
concerns of justice. 
Dennis McKerlie’s great contribution 
to the fi eld has been to highlight an impor-
tant third issue, which he calls the ’tempo-
ral subject’ of justice. Many accounts of dis-
tributive justice assume that the structure 
of our distribution should concern life-
times. If we are welfare egalitarians, for ex-
ample, we should be fundamentally con-
cerned that people have equally good lives. 
This would ignore vast inequalities be-
tween groups in a society, including differ-
ent generations, so long as the same pat-
terns of inequality are replicated across 
people’s lives. In fact, this seems much 
more likely to occur with intergenerational 
inequalities than between other kinds of 
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social groups, since all of us will occupy 
different age groups at different times. Jus-
tice between age groups has thus been 
seen by some as fundamentally different to 
justice between other groups, because indi-
viduals will occupy many different groups 
across a lifetime.
It is true that the respective groups in a 
society with age group inequalities could 
live equally good lives. But we would also 
see stark inequality at every stage of this 
society. At all times, the best off might be 
far above the worst off. McKerlie’s distinc-
tive claim is that theories of justice which 
concern themselves solely with distribu-
tions across lifetimes ignore individuals’ 
states at particular times, and that we need 
a distinct time-slice principle to correct 
that problem. Justice Between the Young and 
the Old (hereafter, Justice) builds on and 
adapts his prior case for considering our 
shares at particular times in their own 
right, and not just to the extent that they 
contribute to the overall structure of our 
lives. 
McKerlie acknowledges the impor-
tance of treating whole lives as morally im-
portant units; even if we think there is a dis-
tinct importance to shorter periods, our ex-
istence as temporally extended beings must 
have repercussions for our theory of justice. 
A theory that ignored lifetime distributions 
entirely would fail to recognise the ways in 
which defi cits at one point in a person’s life 
can be compensated for at other times. He 
then deals with a distinctive objection to his 
approach from Norman Daniels’ Pruden-
tial Lifespan Account (PLA), which claims 
to recognise our concern with individuals’ 
states at particular times, but challenges 
McKerlie’s claim that we need a distinct 
time-restricted principle. Daniels takes the 
observation that we all inhabit different 
age groups over our lives, and reduces the 
interpersonal question of intergenerational 
distribution to an intrapersonal question of 
prudence. When an elderly person sacrifi c-
es some of her share to improve a young 
person’s lot, she can see herself in that 
younger person, so long as she benefi tted 
in her youth from similar sacrifi ce. The 
prudential account explains our concern 
with particular times—since at least on 
some theories it would be imprudent to al-
low yourself to become too badly off at any 
one time—without the conceptual baggage 
of an independent time-slice principle. 
I will consider two of McKerlie’s re-
sponses. He questions the link between 
even such hypothetical prudence and jus-
tice. Daniels’ prudential view is able to 
make people’s complete lives better, but 
that this ’does not explain why we should 
regard a departure from the prudential 
distribution as an injustice rather than a 
merely ineffi cient use of resources’. But 
while it is true that a distribution’s being 
prudential does not make it just, Daniels 
could surely respond that a deviation from 
prudence for some would be an injustice, 
because those people would have to make 
sacrifi ces at other times for others’ pruden-
tially sound distributions. The reduction 
of the interpersonal to an intrapersonal 
distribution is only fair if all generations 
go through roughly the same pattern. This 
may in itself be a weakness of the PLA, 
since changing socio-economic circum-
stances may make it impossible to replicate 
the same pattern across generations, but 
McKerlie does not entertain this response. 
The second response notes a problem 
with Daniels’ assumption that all individu-
als will live equally long lives, and that 
those lives will be ’complete’ i.e. include all 
ages. This assumption counters the worry 
that a prudential deliberator would know 
that she is less likely to reach older ages, 
and so assign lower resource shares to old-
er people for reasons that are irrelevant to 
justice. One problem with the equal lives 
assumption is that it is false. Daniels might 
claim that this is merely a simplifying as-
sumption which we can drop prior to im-
plementation. But as Lazenby [2011] notes, 
this assumption grounds Daniels’ intraper-
Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review, 2015, Vol. 51, No. 3
564
sonal conclusions in a way that makes it 
hard to relax while retaining those central 
conclusions. Once we abandon the equal 
lives view, it becomes much harder for a 
young person to see herself in her elderly 
neighbour, since she might not make it to 
that age. McKerlie also notes that if we as-
sume we will live through a ’complete’ life, 
the status of our calculations as prudential 
looks suspect; for a prudential calculation 
would surely include a sense of how likely 
we are to die at different ages. If we assume 
we will live a complete life, we cannot in-
clude such data. 
McKerlie has previously defended 
equality as the goal that should govern our 
time-restricted principle. However, despite 
defending the intuitiveness of this idea in 
Justice, he ultimately acknowledges an ap-
parently insurmountable problem. This 
central problem is choosing the length of 
the time-slices with which we are con-
cerned. Any choice seems somewhat arbi-
trary, perhaps aside from a concern with 
momentary states; but an egalitarian ver-
sion of this view seems implausible, since 
it would have us object to momentary ine-
qualities between individuals that just 
seem innocuous. Although McKerlie has 
previously suggested that this no great is-
sue for his theory, he now regards it as a 
knockdown objection. As such, he prefers 
prioritarianism for his time-slice principle. 
At this point, it is worth noting an is-
sue in the book’s methodology. Justice is 
heavily reliant on intuitive responses to hy-
pothetical cases, and the defence of time-
slice prioritarianism is no exception. At 
times, this reliance on intuition is some-
what weak since it is not backed by much 
exploration of the reasons behind our intu-
itions. Having devoted signifi cant discus-
sion to two of the three mainstream struc-
tural views, McKerlie relegates his dismiss-
al of suffi cientarianism to a single footnote. 
His reasons for not addressing suffi cientar-
ianism are twofold. The fi rst is that he 
fi nds it ’intuitively implausible’, while the 
second is that he regards it as simply a 
form of prioritarianism.
These two reasons make an odd pair. 
The latter suggests that suffi cientarianism 
is too similar to prioritarianism to make it 
worth addressing. That may be true under 
some taxonomies of the approaches, al-
though it would still have been worth un-
packing that claim; even if suffi cientarian-
ism turns out to be only a branch of priori-
tarianism, it is a branch with enough dif-
ference from its parent view to make it 
worth discussing in an under-explored 
avenue like time-slice distribution. More 
importantly, this pair of views commits 
McKerlie to the surprising view that suffi -
cientarianism is (a) too similar to prioritar-
ianism to spend time on, but (b) implausible 
even though it is barely distinct from the 
view he actually adopts. 
Even if McKerlie is right to reject suffi -
cientarianism, there is a distinct weakness 
to his doing so on the basis of unspecifi ed 
intuition, given the reliance of Justice on 
our intuitive reactions to particular cases. 
Although some may fi nd this a questiona-
ble method of doing ethics at all, I person-
ally felt my agreement with several exam-
ples to be based on a concern for those in-
volved being absolutely badly off. For in-
stance, McKerlie opens the book with a 
vivid picture of what is wrong with a pure-
ly lifetime view, imagining a society where 
after an ’affl uent and happy’ life, the elder-
ly are shipped off to ’overcrowded and 
badly managed’ retirement homes, which 
afford them ’little dignity and little oppor-
tunity for anything approaching happi-
ness’. There is certainly space for prioritar-
ians to explain this concern—especially if 
McKerlie is right to say that suffi cientari-
anism is just a brand of prioritarianism—
but this is surely prima facie suffi cientarian 
territory. 
One reason for failing to explore a suf-
fi cientarian time-slice principle may have 
been a desire to leave room for what seems 
to be the second ’half’ of the book, follow-
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ing the mid-point conclusion of what our 
time-restricted principle should be. The 
second half of Justice begins by considering 
whether a time-restricted view is commit-
ted to a revisionary theory of personal 
identity. The thought is that a concern for 
periods of time shorter than a life might 
seem to demand that we see individuals as 
in some sense different people in their 
youth and their old age. This would ex-
plain why gains at one point cannot (fully) 
compensate for losses at another. McKerlie 
claims that such a move is unnecessary, 
and indeed would show too much. If I will 
be a different person in my old age then 
I should replace my prudential concern 
with my future self with something akin 
to the moral concern that I show other 
 people. 
McKerlie makes interesting observa-
tions about the implications of his view for 
our theory of prudence. If we think it right 
to step in when people are particularly 
badly off, even at the cost of maximising 
their welfare across their entire life, per-
haps we should rethink the classical view 
of prudence as maximising lifetime value. 
Perhaps the best kind of life includes facts 
about distribution as well as about total 
value, including the avoidance of severe 
suffering at any one time. To risk repeating 
myself, however, this seems a fundamen-
tally suffi cientarian idea. A time-slice pri-
oritarian would surely want to avoid peo-
ple becoming worse off at particular times, 
even at the cost of their life going worse 
overall. But the persuasive element of Mc-
Kerlie’s discussion concerns the rationality 
of being above certain thresholds. Some 
classifi cations will make this approach 
available to prioritarians; but it is at least a 
prima facie suffi cientarian idea. 
A discussion of suffi cientarianism 
might have been more apt, given the cen-
tral focus of Justice, than the fi nal two sub-
stantive chapters. The material in these 
chapters is well worth reading on its own 
merits. The fi rst considers the problem of 
changing preferences. The satisfaction of 
preferences and realisation of values pre-
sumably has an impact on how one’s life 
goes. These attitudes often change—some-
times quite radically—as we age, and it is 
central to prudential reasoning to decide 
how to accommodate this fact. McKerlie 
offers a clear and interesting summary of 
the various proposals in this area. The last 
full chapter applies this discussion to Alz-
heimer’s disease. Since Alzheimer’s often 
radically divorces sufferers from their pre-
vious values and attitudes, it is certainly 
apt for discussion, and McKerlie applies 
the conclusions of the previous chapter 
with care and precision. 
As interesting as these chapters are, 
there is a certain lack of unity with the rest 
of the book, made particularly stark in 
the fact that these chapters barely merit a 
mention in the fi nal summary chapter. 
McKerlie notes at the start of this latter dis-
cussion that social institutions should aim 
to make lives as good as possible, and that 
this requires our knowing what makes 
a life good. But it would have been inter-
esting to have made greater connections 
with the central philosophical discussion 
in Justice. 
There are certainly further links to be 
made. First, Justice earlier discusses the is-
sue of personal responsibility as a con-
straint on theories of distributive justice, 
but he does not seem to draw much con-
nection between the role of responsibility 
and changes in an individual’s values over 
time. If a subject’s being responsible for 
her poor condition weakens our justice ob-
ligations, as McKerlie argues, does a lack 
of connection between different stages of a 
life in turn undermine this weakening ef-
fect? Second, given McKerlie’s view that 
prudence should incorporate the value of 
priority—a view he suspends for this latter 
discussion—and that there is independent 
value to just distributions, is the state justi-
fi ed to act coercively in making our lives 
go as well as possible? These are hard 
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questions, but they seem to me to be at the 
appropriate level of generality for a book 
of this kind, and central to the motivating 
question that drives it. 
Ben Davies
King’s College, London
benjamin.1.davies@kcl.ac.uk
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In this rich book Zenonas Norkus aims to 
develop a general theory of patterns of 
post-communist transitions, constructed 
using the method of multi-value compara-
tive qualitative analysis. He goes to great 
lengths to avoid the teleological traps of 
transitology in explaining the ’entire spec-
trum of economic and political outcomes of 
post-communist transformation’ (p. 13). 
Even more ambitiously, the author aims to 
explicate the entire spectrum of political 
and economic outcomes of the post-social-
ist transformations. Norkus complements 
an impressive methodological display with 
in-depth historical inquiries. On the other 
hand, it seems legitimate to ask: does this 
allow the author to offer innovative in-
sights, or does this amount to a re-iteration 
of the ’fanciful’, yet rigid, comparative im-
petus of transition studies? This represents 
the lingering question for a work that sur-
prisingly juxtaposes a very refi ned small 
intra-Baltic comparison, with a rather rigid, 
overarching comparison, that echoes the 
forcing and oftentimes static ’state-of-the-
art’ of political science transition studies. 
The book begins with a neat layout of 
typologies of communist regimes follow-
ing Kitschelt, which is laced with small in-
serts of interwar history. The scope is very 
wide: outside the typical clusters of CEE 
communist regimes, detailed dissections 
of China and Vietnam are used in the con-
struction of in-depth variables. By building 
on his previous work on ’mechanismic ap-
proaches’ [Norkus 2005], the author is ex-
tremely precise in delineating the strong 
and soft points of competing explanations 
of communist regimes (such as commu-
nism as path to modernisation and com-
munism as totalitarianism). While a pinch 
of salt can be advocated in reading the 
overarching comparison of a centrally 
planned economy to an oikos, individual 
points about regime typologies warrant at-
tention as they open up fascinating re-
search avenues. To give just some exam-
ples, Norkus suggests pushing the path-
starting moment of certain social phenom-
ena in national-communist regimes to the 
interwar (p. 40), and argues that middle 
classes of patrimonial-communist regimes 
originate from villages and hence see their 
mobility as ’historical’ success (p. 41). Sim-
ple and effective defi nitions and thresh-
olds characterize the otherwise detailed 
categorisations—transition as exit (p. 43; 
unlike Kopecky and Mudde [2000], who 
defi ne transition as the time-lapse between 
the dissolution of the old regime and the 
installation of a new one) and the country 
is considered as not being communist 
when Marxism-Leninism stops being the 
offi cial or dominant discourse, or when the 
Communist Party loses its monopoly, or 
when a free market starts to function 
(p. 44). It is exactly in this line of thought 
that the author confi rms the existing con-
sensus that transition and consolidation 
are different (p. 89). 
From the very careful categorisation 
stems one of the author’s central aims: a 
’hard’ theory which can predict outcomes 
under different combinations of initial con-
